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Summary
The Customer First Programme (the Programme) was established in 2006 to 1 
centralise the processing of applications for student loans and grants in England. Its 
main aims are to improve customer service (through faster processing and greater 
consistency); achieve financial savings; and improve governance. The Secretary of State 
for Business, Innovation and Skills has statutory responsibility for delivery of student 
finance and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (the Department) retains 
overall accountability for the Programme. 
The assessment of finance applications had previously been done by local 2 
authorities but this role is being centralised and transferred to the Student Loans 
Company (the Company), a non-departmental public body. The Company began 
processing applications for new students for the 2009-10 academic year (the first of a 
three year phased introduction) in February 2009. The service run by the Company for 
students in England is known as Student Finance England.
Following media reports of problems with the Company’s handling of applications 3 
in 2009, the Minister of State for Higher Education and the Company’s Chairman 
asked Professor Sir Deian Hopkin to undertake a review, which was published in 
December 2009. The Department and the Company have accepted Professor Hopkin’s 
recommendations in full. We began our evaluation of the first year of the Programme in 
October 2009 and have been able to go beyond Professor Hopkin’s review in four main 
respects by:
interrogating the Company’s data to analyse its performance;¬¬
surveying 1,000 first-year students regarding their experiences;¬¬
examining financial data to assess value for money; and¬¬
evaluating ongoing risks to the Programme.¬¬
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Key findings
Developing a centralised system
The Department had a clear rationale for centralising the service, but both 4 
the Department and the Company underestimated the risks and did not do 
enough to mitigate them. The Company organised premises and staffing in time for the 
launch of the service, but centralisation involved new management and staff. The work 
was challenging, involving peaks in demand, complex regulations and inexperienced 
customers. Although the Company had run a one year pilot in 2006, covering 11 local 
authorities, and has continued this service, it was insufficient preparation for 2009 when 
it would be integrating a service previously carried out by 130 authorities. 
Processing applications
The Company made slow progress in processing applications, with only 5 
46 per cent fully processed by the start of term compared with 63 per cent in 
2008-09. From February 2009, applications arrived more quickly than the Company could 
process them and, by 6 September, 241,000 new student applications had been received 
but not fully processed. As a result, with the beginning of term approaching, the volume 
of phone calls grew dramatically to 4 million in September. From July, the Company made 
increasing use of provisional and interim assessments (76,300 by the start of term) which 
allow for faster payment but later require re-working by the Company (Figure 1 overleaf). 
The Company considers that provisional and interim assessments are a well-established 
and legitimate mechanism where there is incomplete information or term start dates are 
imminent. However, these assessments are not equivalent to fully processed applications 
as those who receive provisional funding may have to repay part of their award and those 
who receive interim payments are awarded only the non means-tested amount which 
may not be adequate for their needs. By 15 November, around two months after the 
start of term, and with another 27,000 applications having arrived, the Company had fully 
processed and paid all monies due on 67 per cent of some 412,000 new applications, 
paid all monies claimed on a further 20 per cent of applications and made some payments 
on a further 3 per cent. At this time, 5,600 applicants who had applied before the 
administrative deadlines in April and June had not been paid. 
The Programme is intended to reduce processing times, but the average 6 
time taken to process an application in 2009-10 was 33 per cent longer than in 
2008-09. Our analysis found that an application took an average of 12.4 weeks to be 
fully processed in 2009-10, compared with 9.3 weeks in 2008-09 when local authorities 
were responsible for the assessment process.
Targets for processing applications do not cover the whole process from 7 
receipt to approval. The Company’s target measures the time from application 
received to ‘initial decision’, which is not the same as fully processed. Fifty-two per cent 
of the Company’s ‘initial decisions’ were a request from the Company for additional 
evidence from the applicant to allow the assessment to be completed. 
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Management information is inadequate for Disabled Students’ Allowances 8 
and other targeted support. By 31 December 2009 only 4,000 (24 per cent) of 
17,000 applications for the Allowances had been paid, taking an average of 20 weeks. 
This poor performance was invisible to management because targets set for the 
Allowances cover only part of the process. For other targeted support (Childcare Grants, 
Adult Dependants’ Grant, and Parents’ Learning Allowance) the Company has no 
management information that makes it possible to measure processing time.
Figure 1
Performance in processing applications and volume of phone calls, 
2009-10
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Company data
NOTE
This analysis includes new applications processed by the Company in respect of the 2009-10 academic year and phone 
calls received by the Company in respect of all applications and loan repayments.
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Operational problems
The failure of the document scanning system was critical in 2009. 9 A new 
scanning system was to provide electronic copies of documents to the processing 
teams. Launched before being fully tested, the system did not work as required and the 
Company’s contingency plan was seriously flawed and its implementation delayed. As 
paper evidence from applicants arrived the Company failed to store it in a way that was 
easy to retrieve and a backlog built up. The Company told us that the contract did not 
sufficiently specify the scale of operation required but the supplier subsequently carried 
out additional work to enable the scanning system to be relaunched, which it expects 
to do in March 2010. The Company considers that sufficient contingency planning and 
testing have been carried out. However, it has been over-optimistic in the past and it 
remains to be seen whether the system will operate satisfactorily in a live environment in 
peak months. 
Management of demand
The Company failed to communicate key messages to applicants that 10 
would have helped reduce unnecessary calls. The Company did not explain clearly 
when people should send in their applications, nor when they should expect to receive 
finance. The Company’s contact centre staff could not answer enquiries because they 
had insufficient information about applications. IT changes could also have reduced 
unnecessary calls.
The Company failed to engage key stakeholders effectively.11  Communications 
with stakeholder organisations such as schools, universities and the Universities and 
Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) were inadequate. These bodies could have helped 
keep applicants informed and provided insight to the Company. The Company is now 
setting up a new stakeholder forum.
Customer experience
Customer experience was very poor, particularly for those trying to 12 
telephone the Company. Over the period February 2009 to January 2010 the 
Company answered only 21 per cent of calls within 60 seconds, with 56 per cent 
unanswered. In the worst month (September), 87 per cent were unanswered.
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Financial savings
The Company controlled its delegated Programme budget by making 13 
savings on operating costs, and the Department expects to achieve the planned 
annual savings of around £20 million from 2011-12. The Department expected the 
centralisation of the service to achieve these savings compared with local authorities for 
an initial investment of £41 million. With implementation costs exceeding estimates by 
£8 million, the Company has broadly stayed within its agreed funding for the Programme 
by reducing operating costs and deferring some elements of service improvement. 
In March 2010, the Department agreed in principle to provide additional operating 
cost funding of £9.8 million in 2010-11, but it expects the Company to bear down on 
its operating costs and to make a reasoned case for the level of funding it considers 
necessary in future. In addition, applicants and higher education institutions have 
incurred costs as a result of the problems in 2009.
Oversight of the Customer First Programme
The Company’s Board did not perform its oversight role effectively. 14 It was 
not aware of difficulties with processing applications until it was too late to prevent 
major problems. The Department modified the Company’s framework for governance 
in 2009, and expected this to strengthen the governance of the Programme as well but 
is concerned that this was not effective in bringing about the changes it wanted to see. 
The Company considers that the Department conveyed neither this expectation nor this 
concern to its Board. The Company’s Board is due to be strengthened during 2010, with 
the recruitment of three non-executive directors.  
The Customer First Programme Board lacked expertise.15  Chaired by the 
Department, it has one representative from the Company and one from HM Revenue 
& Customs (which is delivering specific work within the Programme). The Programme 
Board has no expertise in IT, finance or human resources, nor any experience of 
undertaking a major centralisation project. The Department had wanted these skills to 
be involved at sub-programme board level, to encourage the delivery bodies to take 
full responsibility. However, this should not have been a substitute for the Department 
bringing in expertise to support its scrutiny. The Department is now proposing to 
strengthen the Programme Board by bringing in experts to challenge the Company. 
The Department did not monitor the Student Loans Company effectively. 16 
The Department sought to be ‘light touch’ in its commissioning and oversight of the 
Programme, delegating operational responsibility to the Company. It accepted the 
Company’s over-optimistic view that it would deliver a good service in 2009, and it 
was not aware of difficulties with processing applications until it followed up a specific 
complaint from a customer at the end of August. The Department’s experiences of 
problems with other devolved delivery and the weaknesses in the Company that it 
had identified in 2006 should have served as a warning of the risks attached to such a 
challenging programme. In particular, the management information requested by the 
Department did not present an accurate picture of performance. 
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Ongoing risks 
Avoiding a recurrence of the 2009 problems is of the highest priority for 2010, 17 
but substantial risks remain to the successful delivery of the service. The service 
in 2009 was unacceptable and the Department and the Company recognise the need 
to address the serious failings. The Company expects to process at least twice as many 
applications in 2010, when it becomes responsible for applications from both first and 
second years, and it is unproven whether it has the capability to provide a good service 
this year. The Company needs to increase capacity in processing and its contact centre 
in the peak months, and use this year’s additional funding effectively. The Department 
may need to defer its requirement for operating cost savings in order to achieve greater 
assurance that sufficient resources are deployed in time to meet demand. It must also 
consider how it would respond to a recurrence of the failures of 2009. 
Value for money conclusion
 The Student Finance England service did not achieve value for money in 2009, 18 
with major problems in the processing of applications and customer contact. The 
Company took 33 per cent longer to process applications in 2009 compared with local 
authorities in 2008; and only 46 per cent of new applications had been fully processed 
by the start of term. The Company has not allocated sufficient resources to processing 
applications for Disabled Students’ Allowances and other targeted support; and some 
applicants may have been deterred from starting or continuing in higher education. The 
Department and the Company’s Board underestimated the very challenging nature 
of the Programme and lacked sight of the mounting problems, resulting in a failure to 
act swiftly or effectively. There is a strong rationale for continuing the centralisation, 
and the Department still expects to secure savings of around £20 million a year from 
2011-12. However, this benefit would be outweighed greatly by continued poor service in 
administering £5.4 billion of loans, grants and allowances.
In 2010 the Department and the Company must give the highest priority to 19 
achieving a radical improvement in the service, while managing substantial risks. An 
incremental improvement will not be enough to restore the confidence of applicants and 
stakeholders and the reputation of the Company and the Department.
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Recommendations
Timing is critical to success. Our recommendations need to be implemented urgently 
and driven forward simultaneously where possible, with constant monitoring of a critical 
path leading to the successful delivery of student finance for the 2010-11 academic year.
The Department and Company must do everything possible to avoid a 
repeating the serious failings of 2009. In particular, the Department should: 
develop clear, customer-focused targets for all loans, grants and allowances ¬¬
covering the process from application to approval; 
improve its oversight of operations, including by obtaining professional ¬¬
expertise to advise on service readiness;
strengthen the Programme Board to include the right skills; and¬¬
ensure the Company is not overburdened with change requirements ¬¬
during 2010.
The Department and the Company’s Board should actively monitor the b 
Company’s implementation of the following actions:
deploy sufficient, flexible resources to process applications and handle ¬¬
customer contact to at least the standards agreed with the Department 
during 2010;
activate robust contingency plans in the event that significant backlogs start ¬¬
to develop; 
reduce unnecessary calls, through proactive and frequent communications ¬¬
with customers and stakeholders, for example, by letting applicants know 
when they will receive their finance; 
establish an improved management information regime to track operational ¬¬
performance; and
use the recruitment of new executives to drive through a real improvement in ¬¬
the Company’s culture and quality of management throughout. 
The Department and Company urgently need to strengthen their relationship c 
so that there is mutual trust, open communication and shared understanding 
of how to deliver the service this year. 
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The Department must undertake an urgent options appraisal to determine d 
how best to deliver the service from 2011 onwards if the service should fail to 
improve radically. Options should include:
continuing with the Company;¬¬
appointing an alternative provider to deliver part of the service, such as ¬¬
targeted support; and
appointing an alternative provider to replace the Company in delivering the ¬¬
entire service.
The Department and Company should work together to simplify the Student e 
Finance England service through streamlining processes and regulations, 
and pressing ahead with the planned improvements in technologies, 
prioritising those which offer the clearest value for money. 
Government departments should learn from the problems encountered by f 
the Company and the Department in 2009, focusing in particular on:
the need for realistic programme risk assessments; ¬¬
designing programme implementation so that departments are not ¬¬
committed to a service delivery model before they can be sure that they will 
be successful; 
achieving the right balance between implementation costs, operating costs ¬¬
and service levels; and
developing oversight mechanisms that involve sufficient skills and experience, ¬¬
robust information, and a willingness to challenge service providers effectively.
In addition, we fully endorse the recommendations of the Hopkin Review  
(www.bis.gov.uk/hopkin).
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Part One
Background
Students from England who study full time in higher education in the United 1.1 
Kingdom1 may be entitled to subsidised loans to cover their tuition fees and help meet 
their living costs. Students in particular circumstances (for example, with a disability 
or with caring responsibilities), or from households with relatively low income, may 
be eligible for additional support (see Appendix 2). In financial year 2008-09, loans 
advanced and grants paid totalled £5.4 billion.2 
The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills has statutory 1.2 
responsibility for delivering student support in England. Under the Customer First 
Programme (the Programme), assessment of applications for student support, 
previously delegated to local authorities, is being transferred to the Student Loans 
Company (the Company) and this service is now known as Student Finance England. 
The Company is a non-departmental public body, chiefly funded by, and answerable 
to, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (the Department). Established 
in 1990 to administer loans, since 2003 the Company has run a centralised computer 
system and a contact centre on behalf of local authorities. For the 2009-10 academic 
year, the first in a three-year transfer programme, the Company assumed responsibility 
for processing applications from new students. Local authorities will continue to assess 
applications from students who started university before this date, until the 2011-12 
academic year, when the Company will process and pay all applications. There is no 
contract between the Department and the Company, but their relationship is set out in a 
formal governance document. 
Rationale for the programme
In a review of the student finance system published in January 2006,1.3 3 the 
Department found that the current service was unsatisfactory, and that better value 
could be achieved through a fully centralised service, similar to that of the Student 
Awards Agency for Scotland. Its aim was to radically transform the delivery of financial 
support for higher education students, including the creation of electronic data links with 
other organisations. Improvements were expected in the following areas:
1 Part-time students are not entitled to loans but can apply for two means-tested grants.
2 £4.2 billion new loans were issued in 2008-09 (Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, Resource 
Accounts 2008-09, HC 457, July 2009) with £1.2 billion spent on student support grant (National Audit Office 
analysis of Departmental accounting systems).
3 Improving the student finance service (End-to-End Review), Department for Education and Skills, January 2006.
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Customer service ¬¬ – the service would achieve faster processing times, provide 
clearer information for applicants, and remove the variability between local authority 
average processing times;
Financial savings ¬¬ – centralising the service was originally estimated in 2006 to 
cost £10 million to £15 million (which, after more detailed work, was revised to 
£41 million in 2007) and allow annual benefits of up to £20 million;4 and
Governance ¬¬ – a single body, rather than 150 local authorities,5 was expected to 
provide consistency of service and improve accountability.
The Department appointed the Company as the most appropriate body to design 
and operate the new service and deliver specific improvements, so as to allow the 
Department to focus on strategic issues whilst retaining overall accountability for the 
Programme. The new student finance service went live in February 2009, four and a half 
months later than planned because of late changes to the regulations that determined 
the level of student awards. The Company has run a centralised service for 11 authorities 
since a pilot in 2006-07 academic year.
organisation and structure
The Department delegates responsibility for service delivery and improvement 1.4 
to the Company and monitors performance via the Company’s Board and its 
own sponsorship team. Other organisations involved in the process are shown in 
Figure 2 overleaf. 
problems in delivering student finance for the academic 
year 2009-10
In September 2009, the media reported widespread concern over the delivery of 1.5 
funding for English students for the academic year 2009-10. Common complaints were 
that applicants trying to contact the Company by telephone were unable to get through, 
and others were receiving letters asking them for documentation they had already 
supplied. In response, the Minister of State for Higher Education and the Company’s 
Chairman asked Professor Sir Deian Hopkin in October 2009 to undertake a review of 
the service. The report, which was delivered in December 2009, was highly critical and 
made recommendations to improve the service which have been fully accepted by the 
Department and the Company (www.bis.gov.uk/hopkin). 
Professor Hopkin was asked to deliver his findings within a short timeframe 1.6 
and therefore welcomed the review of the Customer First Programme begun by the 
National Audit Office in which we examine the Company’s data and provide a view on 
the value for money of the Programme. Part 2 of this report considers the Company’s 
performance in its first year of delivering student finance and Part 3 examines the main 
challenges for 2010. Our methodology is summarised in Appendix 1. 
4 The financial elements of this Review were updated by the Customer First Programme business case (July 2007) – 
see paragraph 3.15.
5 By July 2006 130 local authorities were involved in processing applications: the work of 11 had been taken over by 
the Company in its pilot, while others had contracted their operations to other authorities.
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Figure 2
The organisation of the Student Loans Company and its key 
stakeholder organisations
Department for Work and pensions
Provides verification of student national  ¬
insurance number
higher education institutions
Provide confirmation that student  ¬
has enrolled
Provide financial advice to students ¬
hm Revenue & Customs
Collects repayments of student loans ¬
Sits on the Programme Board ¬
local authorities
130 authorities processing continuing  ¬
students’ finance applications
Identity and passport Service
Provides verification of student identity ¬
the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills
Sponsoring Department ¬
Chairs the Customer First  ¬
Programme Board
Student loans Company main Board
Governance of the Company ¬
Student loans Company executive
Manages the Company ¬
Based in Glasgow ¬
Student loans Company processing and 
Contact Centres
Based in Darlington, Glasgow and  ¬
Colwyn Bay
Processes applications ¬
Handles customer contact ¬
Source: National Audit Offi ce
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Part Two
Operational performance of the Customer First 
Programme in 2009
This part of the report focuses on:2.1 
developing the centralised service;¬¬
processing applications;¬¬
targeted support; and ¬¬
customer experience.¬¬
Developing the centralised service
In April 2006 the Company began a pilot, taking over processing responsibilities 2.2 
from 11 local authorities. At the time, consultants commissioned by the Department 
suggested this would be “extremely useful […] in order to avoid surprises when the 
operational model is scaled to the national level”. While the Company did learn some 
lessons, it failed to design and test its pilot with “a clear eye on process and […] design 
for the national scale”, as recommended in the consultants’ report.6 The Company 
argued in November 2009 that the pilot was of limited use “in part because the volume 
of work involved in running [it] was only about a tenth of the full volume” in 2009.7 The 
pilot was evaluated in 2007 but the exercise was not sufficient preparation for going live; 
nor was there any piloting of the document scanning system introduced in 2009. 
In readiness for the planned launch in September 2008, the Company leased and 2.3 
fitted out new premises in Darlington for its processing and additional telephone contact 
capacity. The premises opened in June 2008, at a cost of £8.7 million, with the design 
winning national awards. During 2008-09 the Company recruited some 380 new staff 
in Darlington. For telephone enquiries, it supplemented internal staff with outsourcing 
to allow for flexible staffing levels; for processing applications, staff were employed on 
permanent contracts. This reduced the Company’s capacity to flex its resources to meet 
the cyclical nature of its work (Figure 3 overleaf). Although the success of operations 
at Darlington would be critical to the performance of the new service, the Company did 
not relocate any executives from Glasgow to Darlington, relying instead on managers 
recruited locally. The Company later acknowledged the need for better leadership in 
Darlington, relocating an experienced senior manager from Glasgow in June 2009 and 
creating a permanent executive post in December 2009.
6 Mantix, April 2006.
7 Student Loans Company, Lessons Learned from Service Delivery in AY 09–10, November 2009.
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A key element of the new service was IT projects, estimated in the business case 2.4 
at £14 million, to provide new technology for the contact centre, scanning equipment, 
and secure data sharing with third parties such as the Identity and Passport Service, 
all of which built on a stable IT platform for assessing applications. At the end of 
December 2009, the Company was forecasting an overspend of £10.5 million on IT. This 
can be attributed in part to a £6 million overspend on the new contact centre technology 
and £1 million on the scanning solution. The specification for the contact centre 
technologies has significantly altered since the business case was developed and the 
solution is not currently operational. IT also accounts for three of the five Programme items 
the Department considers are at significant risk of non-delivery in academic years 2009-10 
and 2010-11. The additional costs on IT were incurred with the knowledge that there were 
offsetting savings available within the overall Programme budget, as reported to both the 
Company Board and the Programme Board.
In the first year of the centralised system all applicants for means-tested support 2.5 
had to provide supporting evidence on paper. The Company planned to scan this in 
Glasgow, sending electronic copies to the processing teams in Darlington. The risk 
inherent in implementing a new scanning solution was not recognised by the Company, 
and there was insufficient project discipline and executive oversight of the solution. 
Following delays in implementation, the Company decided to launch the scanning in 
Figure 3
Staffing levels in Student Finance England operations, September 2008 
to January 2010
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Company data
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April 2009 before it had been fully tested, expecting to resolve any teething problems 
as they arose. The Company and its supplier were, however, unable to scan work at the 
required volumes and after seven weeks’ delay the Company decided to introduce a 
manual process.
Failure of the scanning solution had serious consequences for the processing of 2.6 
applications because the Company’s business processes involved separating applications 
from supporting documentation. Its contingency plans did not cover this separation and 
the Company was forced to develop new processes in a ‘live’ environment in June 2009. 
In doing so, it failed to store paper documents in a way that was easy to retrieve and a 
backlog built up. The Company told us that the contract did not sufficiently specify the 
scale of operation required but that the supplier subsequently carried out additional work 
to enable the relaunch of the scanning in March 2010. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether it will operate satisfactorily in a live environment in the peak months. Deficiencies 
in the procurement process are due in part to the Company’s decision to spend its budget 
before the end of the 2008-09 financial year. 
processing applications
Processing an application comprises three main stages: application, assessment, 2.7 
and payment (Figure 4 overleaf). The applicant submits a paper or online application 
form and provides evidence of identity and income; the Company checks the details and 
issues an ‘assessment of entitlement’; online applicants must then return a declaration 
form, accepting the terms and conditions of the loan; the Company then issues a 
payment schedule letter that entitles the applicant to funds on enrolment at university.
The Company’s target, set by the Department, for processing applications 2.8 
measures the time from the application being received to ‘initial decision’. Using this 
definition, Figure 5 on page 19 shows the Company almost achieved its targets for 
processing online applications but performed poorly in processing paper applications 
(22 per cent of all applications). Compared with the previous year (when almost all 
applications were assessed by local authorities), the Company reduced the average time 
taken for an ‘initial decision’ from 17 working days to 8 working days.
This target has serious weaknesses, however, as it does not cover the whole 2.9 
process from receipt of application to approval (see Figure 4). For 2009-10 applications, 
the ‘initial decision’ in 52 per cent of cases was a request from the Company for 
additional evidence from the applicant to allow the assessment to be completed. 
The clock does not restart once evidence is provided. For 2008-09, these cases 
represented 43 per cent of initial decisions made by local authorities or the Company.
A review of student finance published by the Department in 2006 was critical of 2.10 
the approach of stopping the target at ‘initial decision’, recommending the process be 
measured in full. It also proposed more stretching targets, including instant confirmation 
for online applications which do not require income verification, three weeks for other 
online applications, and four weeks for paper applications.8
8 End-to-End Review, Department for Education and Skills.
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To measure the average time taken to fully process applications, we analysed 2.11 
the Company’s data and found that for the 2009-10 academic year it took an average 
of 12.4 weeks to fully process a new applicant for tuition fees, maintenance grant or 
loan. As Figure 6 shows, this is worse than the performance of the previous system, 
particularly for those applying on paper.
Figure 4
Key stages of the student support process
application
Applicant completes application (online or on paper) ¬
Applicant submits identity documents ¬
Sponsor (parent, carer or partner) submits evidence of  ¬
own income
assessment
Company confirms eligibility based on residency ¬
Company confirms eligibility based on course ¬
Company assesses applicant’s and sponsor’s income ¬
Company issues assessment of entitlement ¬
For applicants applying online, applicant provides  ¬
paper signature
Company confirms applicant’s National Insurance  ¬
Number is valid
Company confirms applicant’s bank details are valid ¬
payment
Company issues payment schedule letter to applicant ¬
Higher education institution confirms applicant   ¬
has enrolled
Company pays support student in instalments ¬
Company pays tuition fees directly to higher  ¬
education institution
Source: National Audit Offi ce
Company 
definition of 
‘Initial Decision’
National Audit 
Office definition 
of ‘Fully 
Processed’
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Figure 5
Student Loans Company performance against its target for an 
‘initial decision’, 2009-10 academic year
 target actual 
  performance
  (%)
Online applications 70 per cent of applications within 15 working days  95
 98 per cent of applications within 20 working days 97
Paper applications 70 per cent of applications within 20 working days 35
 98 per cent of applications within 30 working days 71
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Company data
note
This covers applications from English applicants received prior to 15 November 2009. 
Figure 6
Comparison of time taken to fully process an application, 
2008-09 and 2009-10 academic years
 average time (weeks) 
 to fully process an application
 (all)  (online)  (paper)
New applicants
2009-10 academic year (processed by the Company) 12.4 12.1 13.6
2008-09 academic year (processed by local authorities  9.3 10.5 8.3
or the Company)  
Difference 3.1 1.6 5.3
Returning students
2009-10 academic year (processed by the Company 8.0 8.3 7.0
– continuation of the pilot) 
2009-10 academic year (processed by local authorities) 6.6 7.9 3.8
Difference 1.4 0.4 3.2
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Company data
note
This analysis covers applications received and fully processed by 31 January 2010 for the 2009-10 
academic year and by 31 January 2009 for the 2008-09 academic year. 
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The Company received applications steadily between April and September 2009, 2.12 
but made very slow progress in processing them. By 6 September, the number of 
new applications received but not fully processed peaked at 241,000. From July, 
productivity improved but the gap was closed only from September as the number of 
new applications fell and the Company made extensive use of provisional and interim 
assessments, which enable a payment to be made more quickly. The Company 
considers that such assessments are a well-established and legitimate mechanism 
where there is incomplete information or term start dates are imminent.
Provisional assessments enable the applicant to be paid the full amount claimed 2.13 
based on the limited information provided. The applicant must, however, submit further 
evidence, which may result in reduced funding. In processing the 2009-10 applications, 
the Company made around twice as many provisional assessments as had been 
made the previous year. With interim assessments the applicant receives only the 
non means-tested amount while information and evidence on income is sought by 
the Company. 
In both provisional and interim assessments, the applicant and the Company 2.14 
need to re-visit the claim and do additional work to finalise the application. By the end 
of January 2010 the Company had 80,000 provisional or interim assessments for new 
students awaiting resolution, and there were 18,000 applications which had received 
neither a provisional, interim nor full assessment (Figure 7).
By the start of the first term of the 2009-10 academic year, 385,200 new applicants 2.15 
had applied to the Company for funding. Of these, 176,200 (46 per cent) had been fully 
processed while 95,900 (25 per cent) were not approved and awaiting assessment. 
In 2008-09, 63 per cent had been fully processed by term start and 23 per cent were 
awaiting assessment by the Company or a local authority (Figure 8 on page 22). 
By 15 November, about two months after the start of term, the Company had 2.16 
received 412,500 applications from new applicants. Of these, 276,300 (67 per cent) had 
been fully processed and received all the monies due. A further 96,200 (23 per cent) 
had received a payment but were not fully processed (of which 81,200 had received the 
full amount claimed) and some 40,000 applicants (10 per cent) had not been paid. By 
31 January 2010, the Company had fully processed and paid all monies due on 327,200 
(77 per cent) applications (Figure 9 on page 22). Performance still lagged behind that 
of the 2008-09 academic year as by 31 January 2009, 84 per cent of applications had 
been fully processed and received all monies. 
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Figure 7
The Company’s performance in processing applications in 2009-10
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Company data
NOTE
This analysis includes new applications processed by the Company in 2009-10 academic year.   
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Figure 8
Comparison of processing performance as at the start of term, 
2008-09 and 2009-10 academic years
 academic year  academic year
 2008-09   2009-10
  (%)   (%)
Applications received 360,800 100 385,200 100
Of which:
Fully processed 228,000 63 176,200 46
Provisional and interim assessments 37,200 10 76,300 20
Not approved – awaiting information 12,000 4 36,800 9
Not approved – awaiting assessment 83,600 23  95,900 25
Of those applications not approved and awaiting assessment:
Received within six weeks of term start 41,500 50 34,600 36
Received more than six weeks prior to term start 42,100 50 61,300 64
Total 83,600 100 95,900 100
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Company data. Data relate to new applicants who applied 
to the Company in 2009-10 and to local authorities in 2008-09 (and the Company in respect of the 
11 pilot authorities)
Figure 9
Payment performance as at November 2009 and January 2010, 
2009-10 academic year 
 as at as at 
 15 november 2009 31 January 2010
  (%)   (%)
Applications received 412,500 100 424,000 100
Of which:
Fully processed and all payments due made 276,300 67 327,200 77
Other applications on which a payment 
has been made 96,200 23 83,300 20
Not paid – awaiting information 18,400 5 1,600 0
Not paid – awaiting assessment 21,600 5 11,900 3
Of those applications not paid and awaiting assessment:
Received since term start 6,800 32 7,100 60
Received up to six weeks prior to term start 5,200 24 1,800 15
Received more than six weeks prior to term start 9,600 44 3,000 25
Total 21,600 100 11,900 100
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Company data. Data relate to new applicants who applied to 
the Company in 2009-10 
The Customer First Programme: Delivery of student finance part two 23
targeted support
Some students are entitled to additional allowances or ‘targeted support’ 2.17 
(Appendix 2), budgeted at £178 million for the 2009-10 financial year. Our 2007 report on 
student retention highlighted the importance of Disabled Students’ Allowances, finding 
that students who obtain this allowance are more likely to continue their course than 
disabled students who do not receive it and students without any disability.9
Disabled Students’ Allowances
Disabled Students’ Allowances are the largest targeted support, costing £91 million 2.18 
in 2008-09. By 31 December 2009:
the Company had received 17,000 applications for the 2009-10 academic year. ¬¬
Of these, 5,800 had been approved, and an unknown number had been rejected;
payments (but not necessarily the full payment to cover their assessed needs) had ¬¬
been made in respect of only 4,000 applications (24 per cent); and
there had been 2,500 fewer payments in respect of first year students than local ¬¬
authorities had made the previous year (Figure 10).
9 Comptroller & Auditor General, Staying the course: The retention of students in higher education, Session 2006-07, 
HC 616, National Audit Office, July 2007.
Figure 10
Payments of Disabled Students’ Allowances, 2008-09 and 2009-10 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Company data
Disabled Students’ Allowances payments: cumulative total 
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There are four stages to processing these allowances:2.19 
The student applies to the Company, with medical evidence.i 
If deemed eligible, the applicant is told to attend a centre which assesses their ii 
needs, obtains quotes for products/services, and sends a report to the Company.
The Company decides what support to award.iii 
The student or supplier submits an invoice or receipt to the Company.iv 
The Department has set targets for two of these stages (2.20 Figure 11). By 
December 2009, eligibility had been established within target (15 working days) in only 
45 per cent of cases, with entitlement established within target in just 15 per cent. 
The average processing time over this period for establishing eligibility was 18 working 
days; for entitlement, 22 working days. As with other claims, however, the Company 
does not measure the full process (i.e. all stages from application to approval), but our 
analysis of Company data showed it took an average of 20 weeks to pay a claim for 
Disabled Students’ Allowances in full or part. Resolution of outstanding cases may 
increase or decrease this average.
Figure 11
Disabled Students’ Allowances processing targets, 2009-10
processing stage target actual 
performance
Stage 1: Establishing eligibility
From the Company’s receipt of an application 
to its decision on eligibility
98 per cent or above 
in 15 working days
45 per cent
Stage 2: Assessing the applicant’s needs
From the Company’s advice to the student 
to arrange attendance at an assessment 
centre, to the centre’s submission of its report 
to the Company
No target – the 
Company does not 
manage this part of 
the process
Not applicable
Stage 3: Establishing entitlement
From the Company’s receipt of an assessment 
report to its decision on funding
98 per cent or above 
in 15 working days
15 per cent
Stage 4: Payment of Allowances
From the Company’s receipt of an invoice to 
its payment
No target set Not applicable
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Company data 
note
‘Actual performance’ covers the period February-December 2009.
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Organisations representing disabled students have expressed concerns that due 2.21 
to delays and changes to assessments in 2009 there have been adverse impacts on 
students, suppliers and assessment centres. The Company says that while it may have 
handled cases differently from some local authorities, it is applying existing rules correctly 
and uniformly; and its requirement for assessment centres to obtain more than one 
quotation before paying for services has been welcomed by some groups. It remains clear, 
however, that the Company underestimated the volume of work required to process these 
applications and did not allocate enough staff to the task. While it increased staffing, from 
14 to 25 in August, then to 36 in November, we consider that this is likely to be fewer than 
the number of experienced processing staff that worked within 130 local authorities. 
Other targeted support
For 2009-10, the Department set targets for processing other support grants (such 2.22 
as Childcare Grant), but the Company did not collect the management information to 
record its performance against them. As the Company was unable to supply us with 
application, decision, or payment dates, it was impossible for us to examine its timeliness 
of processing this year, nor how the Company’s performance compares with that of local 
authorities in previous years. The lack of a purpose-built IT system to collate and update 
this information impedes the ability of staff to process these applications efficiently.
Customer experience 
The Company acknowledges that customers experienced a range of problems in 2.23 
2009, chiefly because it:
provided inadequate information and advice, leading to applicants and sponsors ¬¬
not understanding the process;
was difficult to contact by telephone;¬¬
could not provide information on the progress of applications because the IT ¬¬
systems provided contact centre staff with insufficient information; 
lost supporting documents; and¬¬
confused applicants about the amount of support in their first payment  ¬¬
(partly as a result of awarding interim payments).
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Based on the resourcing of its contact centre for 2009-10, the Company set a 2.24 
target of answering 55 per cent of calls within 60 seconds (8 percentage points worse 
than it achieved the previous year), with no more than 14 per cent of calls abandoned.10 
The Company accepts this is far below industry benchmarks, but still considers it to 
have been challenging given its resources. In 2006 the Department had noted the 
Company’s then tougher target (answering 87 per cent of calls within 60 seconds) 
compared poorly with those used by other public sector organisations.11
The Company failed to meet its targets in the period February 2009 to 2.25 
January 2010, answering only 21 per cent of calls within 60 seconds, with 56 per cent 
unanswered (Figure 12). In September 2009, the worst month, it received over 4 million 
calls (as many as in the whole of 2008-09), of which 87 per cent were unanswered. The 
Company’s performance compares unfavourably with HM Revenue & Customs’ (HMRC) 
contact centre operations, which we recently reviewed.12 In 2008-09 HMRC answered 
57 per cent of calls, and from April to September 2009 it answered 73 per cent of calls.13
In December 2009 we surveyed 1,000 first year students to ask their views on the 2.26 
Company’s service. Our survey revealed widespread dissatisfaction with the service 
(Figure 13). Overall, only 43 per cent of students said the application and payment 
process was easy. This compares unfavourably with surveys carried out for the 
Department in previous years. Over the period 2004-2008, around 85 per cent rated ‘ease 
of obtaining’ payments as good or better, with 64 per cent considering applications ‘easy 
to complete’. Overall negative findings are reinforced by a survey of Higher Education 
Institutions carried out in November 2009 for the Hopkin Review (Figure 14 on page 28).
The financial impacts of poor customer service and delayed payments are difficult 2.27 
to quantify, but there is evidence that a sizeable number of applicants incurred costs. 
The biggest impact from poor customer experience could be for students to drop 
out. Some 11 per cent (112 respondents) of our survey said that, as a result of their 
experiences with the Company, they were more likely to drop out from university.14 
We cannot say how much more likely these students were to drop out, nor how far 
the Company could be responsible for those who did. The figures are, however, an 
indication of the potential impact on students who experience difficulties in obtaining 
their student finance.
10 The Company’s ‘calls abandoned’ target refers to callers who hang up while waiting in a queue. It does not include 
callers who cannot get through at all. In reporting the Company’s performance against this target we are including 
calls which could not get through (thus reporting the total number of ‘unanswered calls’): we believe this is the 
accurate measure of performance as experienced by customers.
11 End-to-End Review, Department for Education and Skills. Best practice in the industry is to answer 95 per cent 
of calls. Comptroller & Auditor General, HM Revenue & Customs: Handling telephone enquiries, Session 
2009-10, HC 211, National Audit Office, January 2010; Dimension Data, Dimensions Data Global Benchmarking 
Report, 2008.
12 Comptroller & Auditor General, HM Revenue & Customs: Handling telephone enquiries.
13 In the case of both HMRC and the Company, we calculate percentages of calls answered/unanswered with 
reference to all call attempts, including those which do not get through. However, HMRC’s figures for  
2008-09 exclude calls answered by recorded message. If the Company’s figures are reported on this same basis, 
it answered 36 per cent of calls, February 2009 – January 2010.
14 The question we asked was: “How have your experiences with Student Finance England affected your likelihood 
of staying on to complete your course?” For reference, around 9 per cent of first years (enrolled at 1 December) 
do not continue into their second year. Performance Indicators 2007/08: Non-continuation rates, Higher Education 
Statistics Agency, June 2009.
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Figure 12
Calls unanswered by the Company
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Company data
NOTE
These figures comprise both callers who hang up while in a queue and those who receive the engaged tone (the 
Company’s target refers only to the former).
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Figure 13
Problems students experienced with the Company
 percentage
Asked to send same documents more than once 51
Waited over three weeks for substantive reply to written query 50
Had to ring more than five times before speaking to someone 31
Had not received substantive reply at time of survey 22
Told by Company it had lost their documents 17
Could not get through to speak to someone 10
Source: National Audit Offi ce survey of students 
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Figure 14
Findings from the Hopkin Review survey of Higher 
Education Institutions, 2009
Ninety-seven per cent said experience with student finance applications  ¬
worse than in 2008.
Ninety per cent said student body experienced significant or very  ¬
significant difficulties with the Company in 2009.
Eighty-eight per cent reported rise in finance enquiries from student  ¬
compared to 2008. 
Thirty-five per cent said as a result they had incurred extra administration  ¬
costs of up to £25,000 (and a further 60 per cent were unable to say 
how much extra they had incurred).
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Hopkin Review survey data
noteS
1 Percentages exclude those who did not respond. 
2  Overall, in at least 28 of 221 cases the same university submitted more than 
one response.
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Part Three
Challenges facing the Programme
The student finance system performed poorly for the 2009-10 academic year. 3.1 
This part of the report therefore examines the main challenges the Department and the 
Company will face in 2010.
the challenging nature of the programme
The Programme is inherently high risk because it involves: 3.2 
centralising a service provided by around 130 local authorities with a large number ¬¬
of inexperienced customers;
challenging and cyclical work, governed by complex regulations;¬¬
some new IT and business processes; and ¬¬
mostly new staff working under new management. ¬¬
Many of these risks were highlighted at an early stage. In April 2006, consultants 3.3 
commissioned by the Department identified the delivery model as ‘high risk’. In 
March 2007, an Office of Government Commerce Gateway Review made six 
recommendations to improve performance of the Programme, two of which were 
urgent, resulting in an overall ‘Red’ RAG (Red/Amber/Green) status. Subsequent 
Gateway Reviews were, however, increasingly positive: in February 2008 the Programme 
was assessed as ‘Amber’, and in July 2009 the Office assessed the Programme’s 
‘delivery confidence’ as ‘Amber/Green’.
The Programme continues to be very high risk. Although the Company now 3.4 
has the benefit of a year’s experience, it expects to process at least twice as many 
applications in 2010. This is partly because the Company will retain responsibility for the 
second years it processed as new students in 2009 (though returning students should 
be easier to process), and partly because the number of applications from new students 
is expected to rise again.
In addition, the Department and the Company should have learnt from the problems 3.5 
in remodelling the Education Maintenance Allowances service in 2008. From 2002 to 
2008, this financial support to young students was delivered by two service providers on 
behalf of the Learning and Skills Council. In 2008, with the aim of improving the service 
and achieving efficiencies, the service was centralised under a new contractor. Following 
IT problems and cost overruns, many payments to students were delayed.
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the choice of the Student loans Company as service deliverer
In July 2006, the Department announced that the Company would deliver the 3.6 
new centralised service for England. It was selected primarily because of its existing 
involvement with the service provided by local authorities: managing the IT used to 
process applications, making payments, and answering general calls. The Department 
considered tendering the work to the private sector, believing this might reveal the 
best provider in terms of cost and quality, but decided it would carry higher risks. 
For example, the Department was concerned that a contractor might not deliver the 
service required if its performance targets were not well-designed, and that changing 
requirements might result in disagreements and escalating costs.15 The Department did 
not fully appreciate how these generic risks still applied to managing delivery through an 
arm’s length public body.
The Department was well aware, however, of particular risks in choosing 3.7 
the Company. Reviews in early 2006 had highlighted weaknesses in its culture 
and capabilities, including its contact centre, stakeholder communications, and 
management capacity.16 The Department commissioned the Company to run an 
organisational development programme to enhance its capacity to deliver. The 
Company acknowledged its need to change, introduced such a programme in 2007, 
but it was incomplete at the time the service went live. In its review of lessons learned, 
the Company acknowledged that its culture had contributed to the problems in 2009. 
Crucially, the Company did not sufficiently understand its customers, many of whom are 
inexperienced young people who need guidance. The Company’s failure to empathise 
with its customers was particularly apparent in the relative lack of priority given to 
processing applications for targeted support – i.e. from those most in need. 
The Company is preparing fresh proposals to transform its culture. Following 3.8 
the Hopkin Review, and resignation of two directors, it intends to appoint a Chief 
Operating Officer and three new directors. If these measures do not significantly improve 
performance in 2010, the Department will need to develop the option of contracting part 
or all of the service to other providers.
Service quality
There is uncertainty about how well the service will run in 2010. After further 3.9 
testing, the scanning system is to be relaunched in March 2010; it will handle relatively 
low volumes of work at first compared with the peak the Company will experience later 
in the year. The Company intends to double the capacity of its contact centre in the 
peak month, mainly through increased outsourcing. 
15 End-to-End Review, Department for Education and Skills.
16 End-to-End Review, Department for Education and Skills; Feasibility and Implementation of the End-to-End 
Review, Mantix.
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As with the 2009-10 academic year, before the launch of the applications 3.10 
process for 2010-11, the Department required the Company to provide assurance that 
its business processes were ready. Whilst the Department was concerned that the 
Company’s contingency and communications plans were not sufficiently developed, 
both the Department and the Company’s Board agreed to the launch of processing 
in December 2009, because further delay would increase risks to service standards, 
processing performance, and costs. The Company continues to develop contingency 
and resourcing plans, with more assurance work planned with the Department for the 
coming months. 
management of demand
The Company did not manage demand well in 2009. To help manage its workload 3.11 
it set deadlines for applications (April or June, depending on the type of application), 
which sought to encourage early applications with the understanding that, whilst it 
would still process applications received afterwards, those who complied with the 
deadlines would definitely be paid on time. However, the Company did not advertise the 
deadlines on its website where 78 per cent of applicants completed their application 
form. Consequently, a significant number of students (60 per cent of the applications 
received by the start of term) applied after the April/June deadlines – although 5,600 
of those new students who did apply before the deadlines had still not been paid by 
15 November. 
Our survey shows that the Company’s actions were responsible for a high volume 3.12 
of unnecessary calls. Half of the survey respondents (52 per cent) had called because 
they had received no response to their application; 44 per cent said that the Company 
had sent them a confusing message; and 42 per cent could not find the answer to their 
query on the website. The most common specific reason to call in the first half of 2009 
was to reset a password – but it took the Company seven months to develop, test and 
implement the IT change necessary to allow users to independently reset them. The 
importance of communications is underlined by the main thing students told us they 
wanted the Company to improve: to keep them better informed about their applications.
The Company has prepared plans to manage demand better in 2010 by:3.13 
communicating deadlines clearly on paper and online forms;¬¬
using social networking to communicate;¬¬
making more effective use of stakeholders; ¬¬
introducing a facility for applicants to submit change of circumstances online;¬¬
making better use of ‘customer insight’ work to reduce avoidable contact; and¬¬
increasing its contact centre staff and outsourcing more calls. ¬¬
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Overall, its communications with stakeholders – schools, universities, local 3.14 
authorities, UCAS, etc – were inadequate in 2009. Although the Department and 
Company acknowledged the importance of stakeholder communication during planning, 
the Company did not follow this up. This was a missed opportunity to disseminate 
information as stakeholders dealt with large numbers of applicants but had little 
information to offer them. Following the Hopkin Review, the Company is setting up a 
new stakeholder forum. 
expected financial savings 
The Department had sound financial reasons for undertaking the Programme as 3.15 
it expected to make annual savings of around £20 million from April 2011 for an initial 
investment of £41 million in implementation costs. The Company’s operating costs were 
to be far less than the grants to local authorities for processing applications, although 
the actual costs of the service were not known. 
The Department expected the Company to stay within the overall funding agreed in 3.16 
the business case in July 2007. The Company has achieved this up to March 2010 and, 
with the consent of the Department, is offsetting overspends on implementation, mainly 
due to higher IT costs, through reduced operating costs (including reduced spend on 
information, advice and guidance) (Figure 15). From 2011-12, it expects its operating 
costs to be in line with the business case. 
The significant increase in implementation costs meant that the Company and the 3.17 
Department have agreed that certain items originally specified in the Programme will 
no longer be delivered as part of the Programme (Figure 16). The Programme budget 
included £3.6 million for these items, and they were expected to deliver savings in 
processing costs. Some other Programme elements that should improve the customer 
experience are being delivered in 2010.
Figure 15
Summary of the Company’s fi nancial costs under 
the Programme, to March 2010
 Business latest Variance
 case forecast
 (£000s) (£000s) (£000s)
Implementation costs  34,420 42,799 -8,379
Operating costs 33,820 25,420 8,400
Total Programme costs 68,240 68,219 21
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of the Company’s fi nancial information
note
Latest forecast includes actual costs until 31 December 2009 and forecast costs 
thereafter. Operating costs exclude funding from the Department to meet the 
Company’s costs of running the service for 11 authorities and to process higher 
than expected volumes of applications for 2009-10.
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The Company estimates the total costs for Student Finance England services 3.18 
in financial year 2009-10 at £53.2 million, including the cost of providing pre-
existing services, such as managing payments and providing a central IT system for 
assessments. It includes an additional £2.8 million allocated by the Department to pay 
for the cost of processing more applications than forecast in 2009-10. The Company 
also expects to spend £4.5 million on a redundancy programme to reduce its annual 
operating costs by an expected £6 million. These redundancies arise from reductions 
in the Programme team as its development work tails off, as well as more general 
efficiency savings in services such as human resources and finance. 
A key target of the Programme was to reduce the unit cost from £68 to less than 3.19 
£40. Up to 2009-10 the Company is delivering savings exceeding those in the business 
case and expects to achieve the £40 target by 2011-12. The forecast target for 2009-10 
is £55. The Department will need to consider whether its requirement for savings should 
be deferred until the Company is running the service properly.
The Student Awards Agency for Scotland, which processes applications from 3.20 
Scottish students, was used by the Department as a comparator in the planning of 
the Programme. As Figure 17 overleaf shows, the cost of processing an application in 
Scotland was significantly below the pre-centralisation system in England. The Company 
and the Department expect this gap to narrow, although, as with all benchmarking, 
care needs to be taken in interpreting this as the regulations are not identical in the 
two countries. 
Figure 16
Key elements of the Programme at risk or cancelled
year of delivery 
(scheduled)
planned service improvement
2009-10 Redesign of paper application forms
2009-10 Targeted support application forms to go online
2009-10 Streamlining of Childcare Grant processes
2010-11 Ongoing data-sharing with UCAS (to automatically provide 
and update student finance offers for an applicant’s course and 
university choice, with the ambition of providing offers in respect of 
up to five university choices)
2010-11 Written correspondence enhancements (allowing applicants and 
advisers to access all correspondence)
Source: Department’s submission to the Hopkin Review and comments from the Company
note
‘Year of delivery’ refers to academic year for which applications for support are processed. 
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The problems of 2009 and the rise in number of applications have created 3.21 
additional financial pressure at a time of reduced funding in the higher education sector. 
In March 2010, the Department agreed in principle to provide additional operating cost 
funding of £9.8 million in 2010-11, to cover temporary staffing for the contact centre and 
application processing, implementing the recommendations of the Hopkin Review, and 
other pressures on the Student Finance England service. The Department expects the 
Company to bear down on its operating costs and to make a reasoned case for the level 
of funding it considers necessary in future. It has not yet changed the unit cost target 
for 2011-12. 
oversight of the Company and the programme
While Ministers remain accountable for the service, the Department’s aim was 3.22 
to progressively delegate responsibility for frontline services to its delivery partners. 
For oversight to be effective, there need to be clearly defined responsibilities, good 
challenge, and access to insightful information. Oversight of the Company and the 
Programme comes mainly through:
the Company’s Board which includes six non-executive directors and meets ¬¬
10 times a year;
the Programme Board, which includes one representative from each of the ¬¬
Department, the Company and HM Revenue & Customs; and
the Department’s sponsorship team. ¬¬
Figure 17
Comparison of unit cost of processing in England and Scotland
 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 target for
 actual (£) actual (£) actual (£) Forecast (£) 2011-12 (£)
Student Finance England  62.31 62.53 61.55 51.81 36.81
Student Awards Agency 
for Scotland 37.44 37.58 37.12 Not available  34.00
Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and Student Awards Agency for Scotland
note
These fi gures exclude payment and repayment (which the Student Awards Agency for Scotland does not perform) and 
are therefore not directly comparable with those in paragraph 3.19.
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The Department had introduced a new ‘Service Management and Accountability 3.23 
Framework’ which it intended would provide a strengthened and clearer role for the 
Company’s Board in holding the Company’s executives to account and in ensuring that 
robust strategies and sufficient capabilities were in place. The Department is concerned 
that the change it had wanted in governance, did not actually occur in 2009. The 
Company considers that the Department did not communicate its expectations of, and 
concerns about, the Company’s Board. The Hopkin Review recommended that the 
Board should challenge leadership more effectively over performance and risk, and that 
the skill-set and role of non-executive directors should be reviewed. It also commented 
that the non-executives had no experience of management in higher education. The 
Ministers as shareholders will appoint three non-executives during 2010, which provides 
an opportunity to bring in this specialist knowledge. 
The Company’s Board undertook limited oversight of the Programme. Board 3.24 
members viewed the Programme as operating at arm’s length until activities became 
‘business as usual’, at which point the Board would take ownership of delivery. It did not, 
however, have a formal process for assuring itself that it was ready to do so. Though the 
Board received monthly reports on the parts of the Programme for which the Company 
was responsible, and was told in May 2009 of scanning problems, it was not made 
aware of difficulties with processing applications until late August 2009, by which time it 
was too late to prevent major problems occurring. 
Although the Office of Government Commerce advises that programme boards 3.25 
should include representatives of corporate functions, the Customer First Programme 
Board did not include representatives from IT, finance, human resources, or others with 
experience of undertaking a major centralisation project.17 Neither did the Programme 
Board include a member who would champion the interests of customers. The 
Department decided not to include these skills or representatives because it wanted 
a ‘light touch’ approach, with a smaller Programme Board than had been the case 
with previous programmes involving the Company. Instead, it wanted these skills 
to be involved at sub-programme board level, to encourage the delivery bodies to 
take full responsibility for their areas of accountability. However, this should not have 
been a substitute for the Department bringing in expertise to support its scrutiny. The 
Department is considering how it will strengthen the Programme Board, including the 
appointment of a member who would champion the interests of customers.
At the point of deciding whether or not to launch the service with the Company 3.26 
in late 2008 and early 2009, the Department and the Company did not have a 
realistic alternative to proceeding with the plan, as they had failed to develop detailed 
contingency plans in the period from March 2007. Although the Department had taken 
steps to minimise the risks of transfer from the local authorities by operating a three year 
transition programme beginning with first year students, it did not make arrangements 
with local authorities to extend the pilot or delay the transfer, if necessary, because it 
considered that it would not be possible to obtain the agreement of all local authorities. 
Risk mitigation was considered to be provided by the low volume of applications 
expected at first when compared with the resources available within the Company. 
17 Managing Successful Programmes, Office of Government Commerce (2007).
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Our 2009 report on commercial skills made recommendations for the Government’s 3.27 
use of the private sector to deliver projects, not least the need to improve contract 
management expertise.18 The problems in the Customer First Programme underline the 
need for departments to study how these recommendations also apply to delivery through 
arm’s length public bodies. Our reports on the problems experienced by the Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in delivering farm payments through the Rural 
Payments Agency also provide valuable lessons for delivery through arm’s length bodies.19 
The Department recognises it has had problems with its sponsorship of such 3.28 
bodies, for example it failed to recognise the problems with the Learning and Skills 
Council’s capital programme.20 To improve sponsorship across the Department, from 
2009 it has introduced a sponsorship development function which provides tools and 
guidance for sponsors. The Department has also developed a risk-based approach to 
determining its approach and resources for sponsoring individual bodies. It is too early 
to say what impact these measures will have on the Department’s sponsorship function. 
Management information and risk reporting
Governance and assurance arrangements were compromised by the quality 3.29 
of management information and the effectiveness of communications channels. The 
Company’s balanced scorecard, introduced for the first time in 2009-10, formed 
the basis of performance discussions both at the Company’s Board meetings and 
at performance meetings between the Company and the Minister of State or his 
representatives from the Department. Over the summer of 2009, the balanced 
scorecard failed to present an accurate picture of what was occurring and indeed in 
July 2009 the Company’s Board noted that “it was pleasing to see that all the strategic 
aims were either Green…or Green/Amber [satisfactory].” The Company has a disparate 
set of management information systems and did not create the joined up reporting 
needed to run the new service. Information that we have seen from within the Company 
on processing performance, contact performance and customer satisfaction would 
have given senior management, the Board and the Department a more accurate picture 
of what was occurring on the ground but this was not part of the formal definition of 
the balanced scorecard measures. The Department did not insist on receiving such 
information until it followed up a specific complaint from a customer at the end of 
August. The design of the balanced scorecard, and the measures included, are currently 
being reviewed by the Company and the Department as part of the process of setting 
and agreeing targets for the 2010-11 financial year.
18 Comptroller & Auditor General, Commercial skills for complex government projects, Session 2008-09, HC 962, 
National Audit Office, November 2009.
19 In our most recent report (Comptroller & Auditor General, A second progress update on the administration of the Single 
Payment Scheme by the Rural Payments Agency, Session 2008-09, HC 880, National Audit Office, October 2009), 
we highlighted a number of underlying problems which bear similarities to those in the Customer First Programme, 
including: underestimation of the scale of work, over-optimistic assessments of capability, inadequate management 
information, and lack of detailed engagement by Defra in the operational issues faced by the Agency.
20 Committee of Public Accounts, Renewing the physical infrastructure of English further education colleges, 
Forty-eighth Report of Session 2008-09, HC 924, July 2009, p. 5.
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There were also serious deficiencies in risk reporting. From September 2008 3.30 
to February 2009, the Customer First Programme Board assessed the risk of the 
Programme at the highest level – ‘Red’ – signifying that it was highly problematic and 
required urgent attention. This high status was not made known to the Company’s 
Board. Similarly, during this time the decision to go-live with applications in respect of 
the 2009-10 academic year was made by the Programme Board, which was advised by 
officials within the Department and the Company that completion testing was all ‘Green’. 
This was despite some key components, such as the scanning system, not being in 
place. These examples illustrate a lack of openness and judgement in recognising the 
significance of Programme-related issues, which resulted in risks not being reported 
appropriately and promptly. 
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Appendix One
Methodology
Data analysis:
applications processing data¬¬
customer contact data¬¬
financial information¬¬
To assess the volume of applications processed, the 
Company’s success in meeting agreed service levels, 
the success of the Programme in meeting customer 
expectations and the financial success of the Programme.
Benchmarking:
Student Awards Agency for Scotland  ¬¬
(SAAS)
UCAS¬¬
To gather evidence on the design, implementation, 
management and success of comparable organisations’ 
processing systems.
Document review To gather evidence on how the Department and the 
Student Loans Company have designed, implemented and 
managed the Programme.
Semi-structured interviews:
Department officials¬¬
SLC representatives¬¬
Key stakeholders¬¬
To gather evidence on how both the Department and the 
Student Loans Company have designed and implemented 
the Programme, how successful the Programme has been 
in delivering its planned objectives and how key challenges 
have been dealt with.
Survey of 1,004 students who applied  
for support in 2009, conducted by  
Opinionpanel Research
To assess customer experience of the Company’s service.
A full version of the study methodology is available at www.nao.org.uk.
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Appendix Two
Student funding
This funding is available to students normally resident in England and studying full time 
at a qualifying institution for a first higher education qualification in 2009-10:
type of support loan or 
grant
maximum amount  
(£ annual)
notes
Tuition Fees Loan 3,225 Paid in instalments to the institution.
Maintenance Loan and 
grant1
6,928 Amount also depends on place of study 
and where student lives during term 
time. Up to £2,906 is payable as a grant.
Special Support Grant Grant1 2,906 Available to students on income-related 
benefits in place of Maintenance Grant. 
A full loan can also be claimed by 
students eligible for this.
Disabled Students’ 
Allowances2
Grant1 27,405 Available to students with extra costs 
resulting from physical or mental 
disability or specific learning difficulty. 
Amount is based on needs assessment.
Childcare Grant2 Grant1 13,260 Available to students with children who 
use a registered child minder. Amount 
also depends on number of children and 
childcare costs.
Parents’ Learning 
Allowance2
Grant1 1,508 Available to those with dependant 
children for help with cost of learning 
materials. 
Adult Dependants’ 
Grant2
Grant1 2,642 Available to students with caring 
responsibility for another adult. 
noteS
1 All grants mean-tested.
2 Collectively known as ‘targeted support’.
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